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I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG or the Convention) has been
hailed as a significant achievement in uniform international law.'
The CISG is a culmination of a legal phenomenon stretching back
five centuries to the ancient Lex Mercatoria.2 However, while the
CISG went into effect in the U.S. on January 1, 1988, 3 no one is
certain how the courts will interpret the Convention. Many articles,
law review comments, and private practice memoranda document
this uncertainty.4 It is reasonable to expect that as time passes and
businesses become more familiar with using the CISG to resolve
disputes within its scope, parties will be better able to determine
how the Convention will affect their international sales transactions.

1. Proposed United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods:
Hearingon Treaty Document 98-9 Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15, 25, 28 (1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statements of Peter Pfund, Assistant Legal
Advisor for Private International Law at the U.S. State Department, noting the role of the world's
distinguished sales and contract law experts in writing the CISG; Mark Joelson of the ABA testifying
in support of the CIS, Peter H. Kaskell, Chairman of the Private Lawyer's Committee for the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, stating that the Convention will improve
choice of law issues and encourage international trade).
2.
See generallyRichard Bergman et al.,
The Law of InternationalCommercialTransactions
(Lex Mercatoria),19 HARV.INT'L LJ. 221 (1978) (discussing the Lex Mercatoria,or Law Merchant,
the precursor of private international uniform trade law); LaoN TRAxmAN, TjE LAW MERcHANT:
THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCLAL LAW (1983) (providing an historical overview of international
commercial law).
3.
The United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I [hereinafter CISG], in United Nations Conference on Contractsfor
the InternationalSale of Goods: Documents of the Conferenceand Summary Records of the Plenary
Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main Committee, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19,
U.N. Sales No. E.811V.3 (1981). Signatories include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria,
Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics,
the former U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia. MultilateralTreaties Deposited with the
Secretary General as of 31 December 1990, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E/9 (1990). Guinea, Canada,
and Romania acceded to the CISG in 1991. Id. (update as of Oct. 7, 1991). Ecuador and Uganda
acceded to the CISG in early 1992. lId (update as of Feb. 12, 1992).
4. See Peter Winship, A Bibliographyof Commentaries on the United NationsInternational
Sale Convention, 21 IbT'L LAW. 588 (1984) (setting forth adetailed bibliography of books, symposia,
articles, and commentaries on the CISG).
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Only the application of the CISG will reveal its strengths and
flaws, its consistencies and inconsistencies.5
Commentators further note that parties to international sales of
goods avoid the CISG, and some states" have not adopted it
because of uncertainty over how it will be interpreted.7 In the U.S.,
where courts and attorneys rely on precedent for understanding the
meaning of a statute or code provision, the lack of cases
interpreting the CISG necessarily makes parties wary of using it.
The drafters anticipated states might interpret the CISG
differently. 8 To help alleviate the possibility of different
interpretations, they relied on the standard of good faith,9 and
required that courts and contracting parties pay special attention to
the CISG's international character.1 0 In addition, the drafters made
an effort to use the clearest and most easily interpreted words to

5. Id. As of publication date, no case law involving the United States (or between any
signatory states) in which the CISG is the controlling law has been discovered. In international sales
transactions, most parties arbitrate disputes, the proceedings and results of which remain private.
6. The term "'state," as used in this comment, refers to sovereign units at the international
level and not to the separate geopolitical entities within the United States.
7. V. Suzanne Cook, Note, The Needfor Uniform Interpretationof the 1980 UnitedNations
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 50 U. Prrr. L REV. 197, 217 (1988).
As another commentator writes, "In the international setting, this problem (of varying interpretations]
is likely to be exacerbated by the cultural differences between nations and the lack of a final authority
whose interpretations of the convention would be authoritative." J. Clark Kelso, Note, The United
Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods: ContractFormationand the
Battle of the Forms, 21 COLUM. . TRANSN'L L. 529, 556 (1983).
8.
Analysis of Comments and Proposalsrelatingto Articles 1-17of the ULIS, [1970] 2 Y.B.
UNCTrRAL 49, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2WP.6, reprinted in JOHN 0. HONN LD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF TE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNAlONAL SALES 41, 54 (1989) [hereinafter HoNNoLD,
DOcumENTARY HISTORY]. See C.M. BANCA Hr AL, CoMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW, THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 66 (1987) (noting the problem of states turning to their
own laws for interpreting the CISG).
9. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7 ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to
be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade."). This provision not only explains the
directive given to the tribunal, but also illustrates the characteristic clarity of the language.
10. Id.
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express their intent. 1 The drafters intended these safeguards
to
12
allay some of their fears of inconsistent interpretation.
In addition to interpretation questions, another significant
problem exists: getting the private parties of contracting states to
include their international sales of goods transactions within the
ambit of the CISG. 13 Article 6 of the CISG allows parties of
contracting states to elect not to have the Convention apply to their
transactions. This ability to exclude the CISG at will undermines
the effort to firmly establish a uniform international sales law by
making it too easy for parties to exempt its application to their
transactions. 4
This comment presupposes that actual use of the CISG benefits
the world, the point of view reflected in the reasons for creating the
CISG. These reasons focus on facilitation of world trade15 and
eliminating the uncertainty created by conflicting states' national
laws. 16 These reasons are discussed further in Part HLI.D of this
comment. Naturally, a decision by a state not to adopt the CISG,
or by parties of contracting states to opt out of the CISG, creates

11. JoHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER TnE 1980 UNTED
NATIONS CONVENTION 69 (1989) [hereinafter HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES]. The drafters
intentionally avoided words which retained a legal meaning. For example, the French concept of
deliverance, a property right concept of contract law, was overtly omitted from the Convention since
its analogue was not found in several of the other states' legal systems, and partly because the word
implies "delivery" concepts found in the Anglo-American legal tradition. "Delivery " in the Uniform
Law on the InternationalSale of Goods (ULIS): Report of the Secretary-General,[1971] 3 Y.B.
UNCTRAL 31-41, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.8, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCumENTARY
HISmORY, supra note 8, at 73; see, John 0. Honnold, A Uniform Lawfor InternationalSales, 107 U.
PA. L Rnv. 299 (1959) [hereinafter Honnold, Uniform Law] (discussing the concept of deliverance).
12. HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 11, at 69.
13. CISG, supra note 3, art. 1. The term "contracting state" refers to a state that has ratified,
adopted, approved, or acceded to the CISG. In this section of the comment, all references to parties
of contracts involving the CISG presume that the parties are from different contracting states.
14. Whether uniformity should give way to the autonomy of the parties is a debate not
undertaken in this article. Proponents of allowing parties to develop the law of their contracts would
find that uniformity should give way to autonomy. The reader is asked to view this article as starting
with the assumption that uniformity is the more desirable objective.
15. Errol P. Mendes, The U.N. Sales Convention and U.S.-Canada Transactions;Enticing the
World's LargestTrading Bloc to Do Business Under a GlobalSales Law, 8 J.L & COM. 109, 114
(1988).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16 (discussing the reasons for establishing the
CISO).
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a problem in realizing the goals of the CISG. Effective uniform law
mandates actual use of its provisions in practice.
Part II of this comment looks briefly at the development of the
CISG and the participation of the U.S. in that development. Part III
discusses CISG article 6, which allows for parties to exclude the
CISG from their transaction or to vary its provisions, and examines
how its legislative history helps clarify the meaning of this
provision. Part fI also argues that article 6 counteracts the world's
efforts through UNCITRAL to establish a vital uniform
international law. Part IV reviews article 95 and the American
reservation thereunder. Article 95 allows the CISG to apply in
transactions between contracting and noncontracting states when
the private choice of law rules indicate that the law of the
contracting state will apply. Part IV also argues that the U.S.
should revoke its reservation. Finally, Part V argues that this
revocation will allow the U.S. to use its dominance in the
international market to encourage acceptance and use of CISG by
more states.
17
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CISG

A. UNIDROIT and the Creation of the Hague Conventions
The first modem attempt to develop a uniform international
sales law came in the early 1930s as a result of efforts by the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDRO ).18 This institute consisted of European scholars
whose objective was to draft a uniform sales law. By 1935,
UNIDROIT completed a draft of uniform sales law for
international transactions, but upon the advent of the Second World
War, the group abandoned its efforts. 9 UNIIDROIT resumed its
efforts in 1951, and by 1964 the group completed the Hague

17. See HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 11, at 47; Mendes, supra note 15, at
109 (for a concise history of CISG); see also HONNOLD, DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at
13-292 (for a detailed account of the documents relevant to establishing the CISG).
18. HoNNOLD, INTERNATiONAL SALEs, supra note 11, at 49; Mendes, supra note 15, at 113.
19. HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 11, at 49.

391

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 5
Conventions.2" The Hague Conventions consist of two documents:
the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and
the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (ULF).21 These two conventions are
the predecessor of the CISG.
During the years of work that went into the Hague
Conventions, the U.S. was absent.' Not until December 1963,
four months before the convention at the Hague, did the U.S. take
an active interest in the proceedings. At this time, the State
Department authorized a delegation to participate in the Hague
Convention drafts conference.' However, by this point in the
conference, the U.S. delegates did little more than make
suggestions designed to include in the conventions elements of the
common law and of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).24 Few
of their suggestions were incorporated into the ULIS or the ULF
since UNIDROIT had practically completed its work. Only five
states ratified the Hague Conventions.'
The U.S. rejected the Hague Conventions, finding the ULF and
the ULIS inadequate to meet its needs26 because these
conventions, based on the European civil law tradition, were
20. Id.
21. Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS), July 1,1964,834 U.N.T.S. 107;
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834
U.N.T.S. 169.
22. See Honnold, Uniform Law, supra note 11, at 303, 305 ("Overtures to the United States
inviting its participation have been rebuffed on the ground that constitutional power over the problem
has been reserved to the several states, and therefore lies beyond the competence of the national
government .... "). Honnold explains away this reason, noting that the federal government may rely
on the treaty power within the Constitution, and suggests that the U.S. was behaving according to
"older patterns of isolationism." ld. at 303.
23. Henry Landau, Background to U.S. Participationin United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 INr'L LAw. 29, 29 (1984). Two of the
representatives, Prof. John Honnold and Dean Soia Mentschikoff, preeminent scholars in American
Contract law, went on to become extremely influential in the development of CISG along with Prof.
E. Allan Farnsworth.
24. Id.
25. HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 11, at 49.
26. Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International
Sale ofGoods: Unificationandthe Tension Between Compromise andDomination,22 STAN. I. INT'L
L. 263,267 n.16 (1986). ULF and ULS were extensively criticized by non-European states who felt
that the Hague Conventions were self-serving treaties produced by a closed, closely knit European
Community. Id.
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incompatible with the American common law tradition.27 The U.S.
was not alone in feeling isolated from the Hague Conventions, as
Third World, socialist, and Asian states were also excluded from
the drafting process.28 Also at this time, the UCC had begun to
receive wide acceptance throughout the U.S., indicating a firm
commitment by the individual American state governments2 9 to
the concept of uniformity in commercial and sales law.3" Despite
the rejection of U.S. participation by the drafters of the Hague
Conventions, the U.S. did not abandon its interest in uniform
international sales law. Prompted by the 1964 conference at the

Hague, the Secretary of State developed the Advisory Committee
on Private International Law to review developments in this
subject.31 The Advisory Committee would keep the State
Department informed of efforts to establish a uniform sales law on
an international level.32
B. UNCITRAL and the Adoption of the Hague Conventions
The creation of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)33 marked the beginning of
27. I at 268. As noted, the Hague Conventions were the product of Western European
scholarship based on the civil law tradition. The belief was that the drafters cared little about
including common law traditions and reflected that sentiment in the Hague Convention. For obvious
reasons, this would not attract the United States to sign on. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cf. supra note 6 (using the word "state" to refer to sovereign nations).
30.

ROBERT BRAUCHER Er AL, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 29 (1977).

Between 1960 and 1968, the number ofstate jurisdictions within the U.S. that adopted the UCC rose
from two to forty-nine (excluding Louisiana but including the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands). The 1960s marked the success of the UCC and a commitment by the states to adopt one
uniform commercial law. That decade also marked the trend in commercial legal scholarship that
underpinned the final draft of the UCC. Id. It is only logical that a body of law as important as the
UCC, embodying decades of work among the several states of the U.S. would be a factor in
developing provisions for a uniform world sales law. Clearly, U.S. legal scholars would not have
worked so hard to enact a cornerstone of U.S. commercial law, only to have to adopt an international
set of laws that bore no resemblance to the UCC.
31. See Landau, supra note 23, at 29.
32. Id
33. HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALEs, supra note 11, at 50. UNCITRAL is composed of 36
member states, chosen according to a formula that assigns representation by geographical location.
A smaller working group was carved out of UNCITRAL, consisting of the following states: Brazil,
France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia, the former U.S.S.R.,
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the United Nations' involvement in the international uniform trade
The Hungarian delegation viewed uniform
law arena."
international trade law as a means to improve world trade and
requested creation of an adjunct committee to study the potential
of an international uniform sales law.35 The U.N. General
Assembly responded to the suggestion by authorizing the SecretaryGeneral to investigate the problems inherent in developing uniform
international trade laws. The Secretary's report, disseminated at a
General Assembly meeting held in December 1966, contained
findings sufficient to lead to the creation of UNCITRAL.3 6
UNCITRAL began its work in January 1968, when it resolved
to make developing and adopting uniform international sales law
its first objective.37 The U.S. took an active part in UNCITRAL
from the beginning and participated in its Working Group, in
contrast to its role in the Hague Conventions. The Working Group
consisted of a subset of the entire Commission assigned to review
the Hague Conventions and report back to the entire
Commission. 8 Perhaps the U.S. learned from its experience at the
conference on the Hague Conventions that early involvement would
be essential if U.S. interests were to be considered in any
meaningful way. Also, early involvement would serve to base
uniform law more broadly and permit inclusion of a wider crosssection of states.
UNCITRAL's initial concern was to determine the Hague
Conventions' role in UNCITRAL's efforts to develop uniform trade
laws.39 The primary discussions focused on whether to
recommend adoption of the Hague Conventions. 4° UNCITRAL
determined that the Hague Conventions would not be universally

the U.K., and the U.S. Id.
34. John 0. Honnold, The DraftConvention on Contractsforthe InternationalSale of Goods:
an Overview, 27 AM. L COMP. L 223, 226 (1979); see generally Symposium, UNCITRAL's First
Decade, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L 201 (1979).
35. Mendes, supra note 15, at 114 (citing 19 U.N. GAOR, Annex 2, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5728).
36. Id. at 115 n.40.
37. HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 11, at 8.
38. Id. at 50.
39. Id at 9.
40. Id.
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adopted, primarily because of their basis in concepts of Western
European law. The Hague Conventions did not encompass aspects
of all the legal traditions of the various states from which it sought
acceptance.41 Instead, the Hague Conventions became the starting
point for a draft of the CISG. UNCITRAL's Working Group
analyzed, criticized, and altered ULIS and ULF separately.42
Ultimately, the Working Group combined into one document
elements of contract formation and sales law set forth by both
Hague Conventions. 43 This draft eventually became the foundation
of the CISG, and was adopted at the United Nations Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods which opened for
signature on April 11, 1980. 44 The
U.S. became a signatory to the
45
1.
198
31,
August
on
Convention
Ill. LEGISLATIVE H-ISTORY
A. Interpreting the CISG Under the Vienna Convention on the
Interpretationof Treaties
The problem of a consistent interpretation of the CISG presents a
major obstacle to widespread use of the Convention. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter Interpretation
Convention] offers an interpretation scheme with respect to
international laws. 4' Article 31 of the Interpretation Convention
states that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith, with regard

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 6.
Id.
Multilateral Treaties Depositedwith the Secretary-General Status as at 31 December

1990, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E49 (1990).
45. Id
46. May 23, 1969, 8 I.LM. 679, reprinted in MARK W. JANUS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATiONAL LAw 13 (1988) (citing U.N. Do. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J.
INT'L L 875 (1969), signed in Vienna, Austria, May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 1980,

but not in force for the United States) [hereinafter Interpretation Convention]. Although this
Convention is not in force for the U.S., the State Department recognizes it as "the authoritative guide
to current treaty law and practice." S.ExEC. Doe. L., 92d Cong., 1st Seass. 1 (1971).
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to the ordinary meaning of the terms within their context.47
Article 32 allows recourse to the preparatory documents generated
in the process of creating a treaty in order to confirmn the meaning
of a particular provision. 48 For a state such as the U.S. which
often relies on legislative intent in determining the meaning of a
statute or code provision, Interpretation Convention article 32 is
pivotal. Professor Honnold of the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.
delegate to the 1980 conference in Vienna and commentator on the
CISG, agrees in his Documentary History of the Convention that
resorting to legislative history may be the way to work toward a
uniform interpretation of the CISG.4 9 Following Professor
Honnold's belief that legislative history may assist in interpretation,
an analysis of CISG article 6 follows.
B. Legislative History of Article 6
Article 6 provides: "The parties may exclude the application of
this convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the
effect of any of its provisions." 5 Arguably, article 6 is the most
important provision in the CISG, because it gives power to the
contracting parties to decide whether the CISG will apply to their
transactions. Article 6 began as article 3 of the ULIS and allowed
the parties, either expressly or by implication, to exclude that
convention from their transactions." The second sentence of ULIS
article 3 is of interest because the CISG is silent on the manner in
which parties may exclude the CISG from their transactions. This

47. Interpretation Convention, supra note 46, art. 31. This mandate is reflected in the text of
CISG, supra note 3, art. 8.
48. Interpretation Convention, supra note 46, art. 32.
49. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at vii.
50. CISG,supra note 3, art. 6. The discussion here of article 6 focuses on the ability of parties
to exclude CISG entirely and does not discuss the license to vary its provisions. All references to
article 6 refer to the final version.
51. Article 3 of ULIS states: "'The parties to a contract of sale shall be free to exclude the
application thereto of the present Law either entirely or partially. Such exclusion may be express or
implied." Analysis of Comments and ProposalsRelating to Articles 1-17 of the Uniform Law on
International Sale of Goods (ULIS) 1964, [1970] 2 Y.B. UNCITRAL 43, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9IWG.2/WP.6, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 41, 49.
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omission raises the question whether a party may imply the
exclusion under article 6.
The Working Group suggested at its second session that ULIS
article 3 be revised to retain the ability of parties to vary the
CISG's provisions or to exclude them entirely.52 The Working
Group consciously omitted the second sentence that appeared in
ULIS article 3. The reasons why are not entirely clear and are
somewhat contradictory. Some members of the Working Group
believed that allowing parties to opt out of the Convention by
implication would create a situation where courts could too easily
find an implied exclusion.53 The effect would be the
nonapplication of the Convention's uniform rules in an instance
where they otherwise would apply. Other members believed that
such a fear was unfounded, but agreed to the change because, to
use their words, "the law does not ordinarily attempt to establish
special rules for construing agreements." '54 By the third session
of the Working Group, this revised language55 became article 5,
with no changes in the interim.5 6

At its fifth session, the Working Group concluded its review of
ULIS and solicited the U.N. Secretary-General to prepare a study
of pending questions on the revisions it had made to the ULIS.57
The Secretary-General received no questions concerning the

52. Working Group on the InternationalSale of Goods Report on the Work of the Second
Session, [1971] 2 Y.B. UNC1TRAL 55, U.N. Doe. AICN.9/SER.A/5/1971, reprinted in HONNOLD,
DOCUtmENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 55, 61. ULIS article 3 provides that 't]he parties may
exclude the application of the present law or derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id No explanation was made for this reasoning. Perhaps these members believed no
special rules which depart from generally accepted principles should be established.
55. Id. The revision reads as follows: "Mhe parties may exclude the application of the
present Law or derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." Id.
56. ProgressReportof the Working Group on the InternationalSale of Goods, Third Session,
[1972] 3 Y.B. UNC1TRAL 79, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SE1.A[77, reprintedin HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 8, at 93, 96.
57. ProgressReport of the Working Group on the InternationalSale of Goods, Fifth Session
[1974] 5 Y.B. UNC1TRAL 50-51, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/25, reprinted in HONNOLD,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 174, 196-97.
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language of article 5.58 By 1977, the Working Group submitted a
draft of its ULIS revisions, known as the "sales draft," to
UNCITRAL.59 In this draft, article 5 was renumbered to article 4
and took on the language of present article 6, although not without
debate.' Some factions supported the proposal that parties who
choose to opt out of the Convention be required expressly to state
this fact in their agreements, and that this requirement be reflected
in the article.6" This proposal was rejected for two reasons. First,
some Committee members believed that parties to a contract are
completely capable of excluding the Convention from their
transactions without stating so expressly.62 Second, other areas of
the Convention allowed modification or exclusion by other than
express means.6 3
The Working Group's completion of the sales draft resulted in
the creation of a 1978 draft, the base working document at the
1980 Vienna conference." Also in 1978, UNCITRAL requested
the Secretary-General to develop a commentary to accompany the
1978 draft.65
In Vienna in March 1980, prior to the commencement of the
conference on the Convention, the Secretary-General requested the
delegations to submit proposals for changes in any of the CISG's
draft proposals.' The United Kingdom submitted a proposal that
article 5 be amended to state that parties are allowed to opt out of
the Convention by implication.6 7 At the conference, during the

58. Reportof the Secretary-General,[1975] 6 Y.B. UNCrrRAL 92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1975,
reprinted in HoNNoL, DOCUmENrARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 213, 217.
59. Report of Committee of the Whole I Relating to the DraftConvention on the International
Sale of Goods, [1977] 8 Y.B. UNCrTRAL 29, U.N. Do. AICN.9/SER.A25, reprintedin HoNN LD,
DocuMENrARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 322.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. para. 57.
63. Id.; see CISG, supra note 3, art. 9 (setting forth the provisions on usage of trade).
64. The 1978 draft was the combination of the Working Group's revisions to ULIS and ULF.
65. HoNNoLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 404.
66. Id. at 364.
67. UnitedNations Conference on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods: Documents
of the Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main
Committee, Official Records, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.81JV.3 (1981) [hercinafler
Official Records]. 'The Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the
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third and fourth meetings of the First Committee,6 8 the delegations

divided over the issue of whether the parties must explicitly state
that the Convention does not apply when parties opt out of it.
The United Kingdom, Belgium, and Pakistan all offered
separate amendments which either required article 5 to include
language allowing for express or implied exclusion, or to specify
the manner in which a party could exclude the Convention 9 The
Pakistani and United Kingdom proposals would allow the parties
to demonstrate their intention to opt out merely by naming the
controlling law in the contract. Others called for the article to state
that parties who opt out must name the controlling law selected in
its place.7" Canada and the former German Democratic
RepublicO7 also proposed amendments. 72 Canada's proposal

International Sale of Goods contains the preliminary documents, the summary records of the plenary
meetings and the meetings of the Main Committees, the Final Act, the Convention and the Protocol
amending the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods; it also contains
a complete index of the documents relevant to the proceedings of the Conference." Id. at ii.
68. Id. The conference divided into plenary meetings and meetings of the First and Second
Committees. The First Committee included representatives from all the delegations and was
responsible for preparing parts I-HI of CISG. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at
3.
69. Official Records, supra note 67, at 73. The United Kingdom offered the following
language: -Such exclusion, derogation or variation may be express or impled." Belgium suggested
adding these two additional paragraphs: "[S]uch exclusion, derogation or variation must be express
or derive with certainty from the circumstances of the case. The application of this Convention shall
be excluded if the parties have stated that their contract is subject to a specific national law." Xa.
Pakistan requested that the word "expressly" appear after the words, "the parties may." Id.
70. Id. Italy proposed that an additional paragraph state that "[t]he Convention may only be
excluded in its entirety where the parties have expressly so agreed or where they have chosen the law
of a non-contracting state to govern their contract." Id.
71. The German Democratic Republic no longer exists since the reunification of East and
West Germany in 1990.
72. Official Records, supra note 67, at 86. Canada would like to have revised article 5
extensively to read as follows:
(I) The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 11,
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. However, except where the
parties have wholly excluded this convention, the obligations of good faith, diligence and
reasonable care prescribed by this convention may not be excluded by agreement, but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such
obligations are to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
(2) A provision in the contract that the contract shall be governed by the law of the particular
State shall be deemed sufficient to exclude the application of the Convention even where
the law of that State incorporated the provisions of the Convention.
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would find that parties had excluded the Convention if they
indicated which law would govern the contract. The Committee
rejected all of the proposals. This meeting ended with the Belgium
representative explaining his view that the foregoing discussion of
article 5 was not so much about the various amendments as it was
about arriving at the meaning of article 5, inferring an inherent
ambiguity in the article.73 The unceremonious, undebated adoption
of article 5 at the thirty-fifth meeting of the First Committee, one
week before the adoption of the entire Convention, suggests that
the delegates retreated from attempting to refine the opt out
provision.74
While the First Committee adopted article 5 without debate, the
Plenary Conference, just four days later, disagreed on how the
article would be interpreted.75 The Italian delegate stated that even
if parties chose the national law of a contracting state, one could
not infer exclusion of the CISG." Pakistan, which abstained from
the final vote, wanted to incorporate express language requiring
parties to state that the CISG was excluded.77 The representative
from Ireland disagreed with both notions,78 while the Spanish
representative expressed regret at leaving article 5 couched in such
broad terms.79
The number of and divergent content within the proposals
illustrate that the delegates reached an impasse in the express or
implied exclusion debate, and that further discussions might have
been counterproductive to the Convention as a whole. Perhaps the
Committee decided to leave the interpretation of article 5, now
renumbered to article 6, to the courts implementing the CISG.

l. The German Democratic Republic would have revised article 5 to read as follows: "Even if this
Convention is not applicable in accordance with articles 2 or 3, it shall apply if it has been validly

chosen by the parties." IL
73. Official Records, supra note 67, at 254.
74. M, at 423. The article was approved without discussion by the First Committee on April
4, 1980. Id.
75. Id. at 201-02.
76. Id. at 201.
77. Id.
78. Official Records, supra note 67, at 201.
79. Id. at 201-02.
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C. How May a State Opt Out of the CISG?
1. The Role of the CISG's Documentary History
After reviewing the legislative history of article 6, certain
interpretation issues remain. The central issue involves
communicating the intention to exclude the Convention from a
contract. The role of choice of law provisions takes on added
importance. Parties need to know whether choosing a law other
than the CISG to govern their agreement is enough to express their
intention to exclude the CISG. This last situation is especially
important to parties with a history of dealings before the
ratification of the CISG who now come under its authority.
In arguing a particular meaning, the Interpretation Convention
allows for resort to a treaty's preparatory documents for assistance
in interpreting its provisions.8 0 For article 6, those preparatory
documents include the reports generated by UNCITRAL, its
Working Group, the Secretary-General's studies, and the Official
Records of the 1980 Vienna Convention. One key document is the
commentary which the Secretary-General prepared to accompany
the 1978 draft." The commentary is important to U.S. attorneys
in particular, since it is common practice for them to use a
commentary in arguing the meaning of a statute. Unfortunately, the
delegates decided to omit the commentary from the final version
of the CISG. Such a decision was not in keeping with
UNCITRAL's request for a commentary to accompany the 1978
draft. The Committee gave no reason for excluding the
2
commentary.8

80. Interpretation Convention, supra note 46, art. 32.
81. Official Records, supra note 67, at 14.
82. Peter Winship, A Note on the Commentary ofthe 1980 Venna Convention, 18 INT'L LAW.
37,38 (1984). The U.S. requested that the commentary accompany the rimal version of the CISG but,
as the history shows, to no avail. Id.
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2. Implicit and Explicit Exemption of the CISG's
Application
An example of when the issue of an implied exclusion becomes
important is where the parties have specified that the law governing
the contract is to be the law of the contracting state of one of the
parties." The comment to article 6 does not specifically address
whether parties may imply exclusion of the CISG from their
transactions. Instead, the rationale expressed centers on preventing
courts from too easily finding an implied exclusion in a contract,
in other words, an admonition to courts to be cautious.
Even without resort to the commentary, the rationale behind
allowing implied exclusion does not change. The same reasoning
was set forth during the second session of the Working Group,
when it decided to omit the second sentence of ULIS article 3.5
There, the lack of express language on implied exclusion also
relates to deterring courts from finding an implied exclusion too
easily.86 One may logically infer that when drafting the comment
to article 6, the Secretary-General relied upon the discussions at the
Working Group's meeting where they discussed ULIS article 3.
While parties of contracting states are left to decide whether
they may impliedly opt out of the Convention, they should be able
to prove their choice using available means of contract
interpretation. 7 These means coupled with the legislative history
of article 6 should provide a strong basis for implied exclusion.

83. A problem occurs where a contract involving a party from the United States names the
law of a particular state of the U.S. (for example, California) as the law which governs in the event
of a dispute. Since the CISG is a treaty of the U.S., and treaties are the law of the land under article
VI, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the CISG would apply. Hence the need for practitioners to be
especially careful when drafting the choice of law provisions.
84. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods,
Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 15 (1979), reprinted in HoNNoLD,
DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY, supra note 8, at 404, 407.

85.

See supra text accompanying note 50 (recounting the beginning of article 6"s legislative

history).
86. Id.
87. Courts would attempt to arrive at the intention of the parties within the strictures of
interpretative tools such as parol evidence, course of dealings, and similar trade practices. CISG,
supra note 3, art. 7-13.
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The legislative history manifests the drafters' rejection of language
permitting an implied decision to exclude the Convention. This is
evident in the deletion of the second sentence of ULIS article 3.
While the legislative history leaves implied exclusion ambiguous,
the stronger argument is to find that parties may exclude the CISG
by implication. 8 This conclusion is based on the rationale
allowing courts to find implied exclusion. The only qualification in
the legislative history is that courts be sparing in their finding an
implied exclusion.
In sum, while careful parties and attorneys will include express
language in their contracts to document their intention to exclude
the CISG, some parties may legitimately exclude the CISG by
implication. What those exact situations are remains undetermined
and will certainly depend on the facts of each case. Most cases are
likely to arise when parties that are used to dealing under a
particular state's national law, have their state adopt the CISG;
such parties might not want the CISG to apply to their course of
dealing, yet neglect to take measures to block the CISG's
application.
D. Exclusion and the Development of Uniform Sales Law
Ultimately, one must recognize that the CISG allows private
parties of contracting states to elect not to have the Convention
89
apply. This decision rests on the primacy of contract principles.
The parties are the masters of their deal and are, therefore, free to
choose the law they wish to rule their bargain. 9'

88. The argument that the CISG permits no implied exclusion might find support in the
drafters' decision to exclude express language to that effect. One would argue that had the committee
intended to allow implied exclusion, it would have stated so expressly. Additionally, since all
proposals to include language allowing implied exclusion offered at the third and fourth meetings of

the First Committee were rejected, it reasonably follows that the committee rejected the idea of
implied exclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 66-79 (reviewing the various proposals for
article 6 which UNCUTRAL members offered).
89. JOHN CALAMARi & JOSEPH PERILLo, CoNTRACrs 5 (3d ed. 1987).
90. See HONNOLD, INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 11, at 105. The basic reason for

allowing the parties to contract out of the Convention isexplained by Professor Honnold when he
says that the "'dominant theme of the Convention is the primacy of the contact." This statement
suggests that central importance is ascribed to the right of the parties to create the bargain they desire.
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The ability of parties of contracting states to opt out of the
Convention has a critical impact on the goals of establishing firmly
a uniform international sales law. Indeed, the opt out provision is
counterproductive to the goal of uniformity because there is no
assurance that it will ever be used. The Committee could have
given away too much by allowing parties to opt out of the CISG
and to imply that exclusion.
At best, article 6 allows the parties to structure their interactions
and promotes freedom of contract. 9 ' This flexibility may be
desirable where a bargaining party will enter a contract only when
it is allowed to choose the law governing the contract. This
rationale seems to suggest that it is better to have parties engage in
international sales and exclude the Convention, than it is to
promote usage of the Convention among states that have adopted
or ratified it at the expense of international trade. This idea
certainly comports with leaving the parties in control of their
bargain.
At worst, article 6 is a shield behind which private parties of
contracting states may hide while they watch and determine the
effect CISG will have on international sales transactions. This
phenomenon is what appears to be happening in private practice.' 2
Parties may continue to ignore CISG indef'mitely and conduct
business as usual. The effect is to reduce CISG to mere theory
never used in practice. '
The logical conclusion is that implementing uniform
international sales law is less important than the freedom of the
parties of contracting states. If a contracting party or its drafting
attorney is savvy enough, the party will be able to escape the

Id
91.
92.

CALAMARI & PERLLO, supra note 89, at 5.
ClSG Expected to Aid Contract Dispute Resolution, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 677 (1987)

(quoting Division Counsel for International Affairs for Abbott Laboratories, Michael J. Feehan, who
recommends staying away from the CISG). Attorney William Rossi-Hawkins of the New York law
firm of Graham & James writes in that firm's Fall 1991 newsletter that business will choose to avoid
the CISG's application to their contracts. Telephone Interview, William Rossi-Hawkins, Attorney,
Graham & James (Jan. 10, 1992). It would be unfortunate to think that after the extensive effort that
went into the CISG, it should only apply by default because the contracting parties forgot to exempt
themselves from its application.
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application of the CISG by inserting express language in its choice
of law provision stating that the CISG will not apply. They would
then state the law of the controlling jurisdiction that will apply in
its place. Although contract law has traditionally respected the right
of parties to create the bargain they desire, article 6 appears
with the objective of a uniform international sales
inconsistent
93
law.
Contracting parties at the domestic level generally do not have
such wide freedom to exclude whole bodies of law. For example,
in the U.S., the CISG is yet another body of law to consider in
making an international sales contract. The same party has no
choice with respect to whether it wishes the UCC to apply in a
domestic sale of goods transaction.' Where the UCC is the
controlling law in a sale of goods dispute between two parties from
the U.S., the legislature has made the choice between uniformity or
party autonomy. No competent legislature exists to make a similar
choice at an international level when the sovereign states who have
adopted the CISG fail to make it themselves. 95
IV. THE ARTICLE 95 RESERVATION
Not every international sale of goods contract will involve only
parties from contracting states. The drafters anticipated this
situation and created an ingenious method of applying the CISG to
transactions involving a party from a noncontracting state. Article
(1)(1)(b) allows the contracting state to apply the CISG to
transactions involving a noncontracting state where the choice of

93. CALAmARI & PERILo, supra note 89, at 5.
94. The American state of Louisiana has not adopted article 2 of the UCC, and is an anomaly
in the foregoing discussion.

95.

The Convention is also a treaty of the United States. Therefore, the Convention is the

supreme law of the land under article V1, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, when the CISG
was ratified by the United States, it became the supreme law of the land. This assumes that the
Convention applies by operation of constitutional law, and no state action or private party action may
deviate from its application. This raises the question where the internal workings of a treaty that

becomes the supreme law of land, allows that it may not be followed, is the function of such a
provision unconstitutional as violative of article 2, section 6 of the United States Constitution? Time
will tell whether this issue will ever be raised. In any event, it may merit a close look by practitioners
who choose to opt out of CISG.
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law rules indicate operation of the contracting state's national
96
law.
This provision, however, is not absolute. Under CISG article
95, a contracting state may declare that it will not be bound by
article 1, subparagraph (1)(b).' Article 95 was drafted at the
Vienna Conference to accommodate certain states which already
developed a set of rules to govern their international sales
transactions.98 Czechoslovakia had already implemented its own
international sales law, and the German Democratic Republic was
considering a similar international sales law." Article 95 allowed
these states to use their international sales law without that law
being supplanted by the CISG.
The U.S. made the article 95 reservation when it ratified the
CISG.1 ° Thus, in a transaction between U.S. and a
noncontracting state, when the choice of law rules indicate that the
laws of the U.S. apply, the relevant U.S. common law, the UCC,
applies.101
Arguments do exist for making the article 95 reservation. In
support of the decision is the ability of U.S. parties to use the
UCC. 1 2 The courts are familiar with applying these laws. °3
Lawyers are aware of controlling precedent and how to use it in
various disputes, whereas the CISG is thought to leave U.S.
lawyers at a disadvantage-when trying to understand the meaning

96.

CISG, supra note 3, art. I ("The Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between

parties whose places of business are in different States ...(b)when the rules of private international
law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.").
97. CISG, supra note 3, art. 95 ("Any State may declare at the time of the deposit of its

instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph
(1)(b) of article I of this Convention.").
98. Official Records, supra note 67, at 229.
99. Id.
100. Senate Hearings,supra note 1, at 38.
101. Even though Japan was a member of UNCITRAL and a participant in the 1980
conference, it chose not to adopt the CISG. One way to ensure that the CISG applies to U.S.Japanese sale of goods transactions is to rely on subparagraph 1(b). This application of the CISG to

these transactions means that Japan would develop a facility with the CISG. Such a facility may
encourage other Japanese trading partners to use the CISG in their respective transactions. Japan has

not expressed a reason as to why it did not ratify the CISG.
102.
103.
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given to terms by parties of other national legal systems."' Also,
the choice of law option with respect to contracting parties is an
important element of freedom of contract."0 5 These reasons were
mentioned or alluded to in the hearing on the CISG before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 6
The reservation was recommended by the American Bar
Association and the private Lawyers Committee on the Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.1" 7 President
Reagan also included a recommendation for the reservation in his
message transmitting the Convention to the Senate.08 In light of
the foregoing recommendations, the U.S. made the reservation in
order to ensure adoption of the CISG by the Senate." 9 This
represents a compromise"' resulting from fear by proponents that
mandatory application of the CISG would lead the Senate
Committee to reject it.'
The U.S. decision to make the article 95 reservation does not
comport with the reasons for creating the reservation expressed at
the 1980 Vienna Conference. The drafters of the CISG recognized
that some states had or planned to develop their own international
sales laws."' The existence of other schemes is the reason why
the drafters created article 95.113 In the U.S., however, the UCC
is a uniform domestic sales scheme that grew out of a domestic

104. Id.
105. CALAMARI & PERILo, supra note 89, at 5.
106. Senate Hearings,supra note 1, at 37.
107. Id.
108. Message of the Presidentof the UnitedStates andLegal Analysis on the UnitedNations
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, U.S. Treaty Doe. No. 9, 98th Cong.
1st. Sess. 21 (1983).
109. Telephone Interview with Peter Pfund, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International
Law, U.S. Department of State (Ian. 14, 1992).
110. The compromise favors article 2 of the UCC. The argument for the compromise may be
summarized as follows. From its inception, the UCC was considered a progressive step toward the
unification of domestic sales law. BRAUCumz Er AL., supra note 30, at 29. Now that some form of
article 2 of the UCC is accepted in all the individual states of the U.S. except Louisiana, and has
produced important case law, it is the preeminent law in sales and leasing of goods. Senate Hearings,
supra note 1, at 38. Therefore, since the UCC is such an integral part of our sales law, its use is
preferred and fostered upon every available occasion. Senate Hearings,supra note 1, at 38.
111. Telephone Interview with Peter Pfund, supra note 109.
112. Official Records, supra note 67, at 229.
113. Id.
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trend toward uniform law in the late nineteenth century." 4 While
UCC article 2 may be capable of application to international sales
transactions, it is not a body of law created solely to accommodate
international sales transactions.
Although the article 95 reservation favors U.S. domestic law in
certain settings, it does not facilitate a wider acceptance of the
CISG among states that have not ratified it, as in situations where
a U.S. party contracts with a party of a noncontracting state. The
purpose of the CISG is to unify the varying rules of private
international law." 5 The history of private international uniform
sales law demonstrates the uncertainty concomitant with such a
legal regime. If there was one underlying reason for the intense
efforts behind the CISG, it was the desire to bring into being a
body of law that eradicated the confusing and contradictory
elements of private international law, yet article 95 works at crosspurposes to this desire.""
Subparagraph (1)(b) strives for an expansive application of the
CISG which encompasses its use in transactions involving
noncontracting states. Under its terms, it naturally follows that a
party from a noncontracting state may find itself having to
understand, argue, and apply the CISG. The effect, then, is to
expand the reach of the CISG and encourage states other than
contracting states to become familiar with it or to contract out of
it. No matter how compelling the reasons for applying the UCC in
international sales of goods transactions, exempting application of
the CISG in an instance where it normally would apply cannot help
but do violence to the objective of achieving universal application
of this uniform international sales law.

114. BRAucHL r" Al., supra note 30, at 21; f Official Records, supra note 67, at 229
(describing the Czechoslovaldan system).
115. C.M. BIANcA HT AL., supra note 8, at 19.
116. See id. (discussing the purpose of CISG to establish world-wide uniformity in sales
contracts).
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V. THE U.S. ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN IMPLEMENTING CISG
The U.S. played a significant role in the development and
adoption of the CISG.1 7 As the Chairman of the State
Department's Advisory Committee wrote, the U.S. was largely
responsible for adoption of the texts within the CISG by proposing
resolutions to many of the legal issues." 8
The influence of the U.S. was also manifest in the consideration
which other states gave to the U.S. signing of the Convention. The
U.S. ratification of the CISG helped induce other states to
ratify.119 The keen interest of other states points to the persuasive
role of U.S. law, scholarship, and trade in other states' adoption of
the CISG, an influence based on U.S. power as a world purchaser
and supplier.
Moreover, trade statistics for 1980 demonstrate the influential
role of the U.S. at the time of the Convention in Vienna. These
statistics indicate that many states relied upon the U.S. as their
most significant export market."1
Likewise, many states
depended upon the U.S. for their imports. Statistics also show that
the U.S. dominated the world market, ranking as the leading
importer and exporter,"' purchasing as much as 83% of the
exports of a single country." With such a forceful place in the
world market, other states naturally would heed any U.S. trade
decision. 123 Thus, in 1980, trade with the U.S. was a factor to
which potential CISG signatories paid notice.

117. Mendes, supra note 15, at 118.
118. Landau, supra note 23, at 35.
119. Mendessupranote 15, at 118 ("It is not an overstatement to indicate that many countries
were in fact waiting for the United States to ratify the convention so that their own bureaucrats would
have an impetus to accelerate procedures for approval of the convention ....").
120. Id.; see infra app. A, thl. I (showing trade statistics for Chile, Mexico, and Australia).
121. International Monetary Fund, DInRToN OF TRADE STArsTIcs YEARBooK 2 (1982)
[hereinafter DmenoN oF TRADE].
122. Id In 1980, the United States purchased 83% of Mexico's exports. Id
123. See infra app. A, tbl. I (showing the 1980 import-export statistics for 20 states that are
signatories to the CISO).
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A. Canada'sRecent Ratification of the Convention
Despite the loopholes in universal application of the CISG, the
U.S. can use its trade influence to encourage the use and adoption
of the CISG. Canada's recent ratification of the CISG is an
example of this influence. 24 Commentators speculated that
Canada would adopt the CISG only because its primary trading
partner, the U.S., had adopted the CISG.1 " It may be that Canada
believed it really had no choice, since the influence of the U.S. in
sale of goods
transactions dictated the standards that Canada should
12 6
follow.
Prior to the existence of the CISG, U.S.-Canada sale of goods
transactions, under the relevant choice of law analysis, lead to
either an application of the UCC or the Canadian Provincial Sales
of Goods Acts (SGA), unless the parties chose another neutral
state's law to govern their contract. While the UCC is a true
creature of American jurisprudence, the SGA is rooted in the
British common law, a key a difference between the two
127
systems.
The U.S. and Canada form the largest trading bloc in the
world. 128 For example, in 1990, the U.S. imported over 70% of
Canada's exports.129 Because of this mutual dependence, it was
in Canada's interest to adopt the CISG. It was also logical for
Canada to keep itself informed of the impact the CISG may have
in trade issues with the U.S. With such high stakes in the U.S.
market, and the potential for U.S. parties to have the CISG govern
their contracts with Canadian parties under article 1, it made sense
for Canada to be ready to implement the most current laws which
its primary trading partner might select. Canada's ratification
results in the unification of the sales law between these two
124. Canada acceded to the CISG on April 23, 1991. MultilateralTreatiesDeposited with the
Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 1990, U.N. Doec. STILEG/SER.E19.
125. Mendes, supra note 15, at 143-44.
126. Id. at 109.
127. 1& at 143.
128. Id at 143.
129.

See infra app. A, tbl. 2 (showing the 1990 import-export statistics for 20 states that are

signatories to the CISG).
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important traders.130 This ratification exemplifies the purpose of
the Convention: facilitation of uniformity of sales laws between
foreign states.
Arguably, Canada would not have adopted the CISG but for the
adoption by the U.S. The inclination to follow U.S. trade decisions
is again evident in the U.S. decision to engage in free trade
negotiations with Mexico. The Canadians felt compelled to become
involved, not out of a desire to participate, but out of a necessity
to protect its interest in the U.S. market.' However, even as the
Canadian ratification of the CISG unifies the trade law within most
of North America, the members of the largest trading bloc in the
world, the unification is in part illusory because there remain ways
for parties to contract out of the CISG.
B. Possible Directionsfor U.S. Influence on World Trade
Canada's recent ratification of the Convention demonstrates that
the influence of the U.S. on world trade still exists. That same
influence may be used to entice others to adopt the CISG. 3 2 Now
that Canada followed, Japan may not be far behind. If the U.S.
desires a uniform law that encourages use, it needs to lead an effort
to have parties opt in to the CISG. Revoking the reservation under
article 95 is one method to reach uniform application. One could
even consider retracting article 6. In this way, parties litigating or
arbitrating international sales issues must use the CISG.
Both article 6 and article 95 defer to the desires of the
contracting parties. Both articles place autonomy of the parties
above the goal of uniform application. If there is a greater of two
evils as between the article 95 reservation and article 6, article 6
surely does more damage to the real muscle of a uniform
international sales law because contracting states need not make the

130. Mendes, supra note 15, at 143.
131. Barbara Wickens, A GiantMarketplace, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 25, 1990, at 20.
132. It may have been easy for Canada to follow the U.S. lead because Canada and the U.S.
are immediate neighbors, sharing a common legal tradition and, generally, the same language.
However, the mere size of Canada's investment in the U.S. market is also a major factor, a factor
not unique to Canada.
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article 95 reservation. The presumption, based on the legislative
history of article 95, is that a state which makes the article 95
reservation is concerned primarily with using its own specially
tailored international sales law in transactions with a noncontracting
state.1 33 Article 6, on the other
hand, is so broad as to exclude
1
the Convention in its entirety. 34
If the U.S. resolved to apply the CISG to all of its international
sales transactions, it would also lead the way in interpreting the
Convention. Since no precedent now exists, the field is wide open
for arguing the most reasonable meaning under any given set of
circumstances. And a good deal of that reasonable interpretation
will be based on the CISG's legislative history. Unfortunately, so
long as parties are entirely free to contract out of the CISG, and are
not bound to use the CISG when their contract involves parties in
a noncontracting state, the CISG remains more a documentation of
successful international diplomacy than a commitment to move the
world toward a viable uniform sales law.
VI. CONCLUSION

The U.S. played a significant role in the development of the
CISG. It could also substantially influence the implementation of
the CISG. Because of the dominance of the U.S. in the world
market, its decisions on international sales law carry considerable
weight. Since the CISG is being resisted by some states and opted
out of by parties of contracting states, the U.S. should reconsider
its article 95 reservation. Such a reconsideration will allow the U.S.
to take a leadership role in interpreting the CISG. As noted, other
states keep watch on the U.S. with respect to trade. They should
also watch for the interpretations that U.S. courts give to the CISG.
At present, no means exist to require the use of the CISG, at
least so long as article 6 grants unlimited power to the bargaining
parties to exclude the CISG from their transactions. The legislative
history provides insight into the rationale behind the CISG's

133.
134.
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Official Records, supra note 67, at 229.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-93 (discussing in detail the scope of article 6).
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principles, and the clarity of the language should alert parties to the
intentional efforts to make CISG easily understood and applied. In
short, the CISG merits a greater degree of confidence than it has
thus far enjoyed. Meanwhile, states and parties are conducting
business as usual, thereby avoiding the burden of having to learn
a new body of law, but also foregoing the benefits which a uniform
sales law offers international business.
Dennis J. Rhodes
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APPENDIX A
IMPORT-EXPORT STATISTICS FOR CISG-MEmBER STATES

Table 1135
1980 Import-Export Statistics for CISG-Member States
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Annual US.

Annual US.

% of Exports
Imported

Exports
(by state)

Imports
(by state)

Value Exported
Annually

220,786

256,984

N/A

4,093

2,782

22,031

12.6%

448

407

17,489

2.3%

3. Chile

4,352

4,000

4,818

83.0%

4. China

3,755

1,164

18,179

6.4%

5. Finland

511

480

14,148

3.4%

6. France

7,485

5,549

116,016

4.8%

7. Germany

10,960

12,257

192,861

6.4%

127

214

1,154

18.5%

80

118

8,637.9

1.4%

10. Italy

5,511

4,688

77,679

6.0%

11. Mexico

15,146

12,835

15,570

82.4%

8,678

2,044

73,940

2.8%

716

460

7,136.1

6.4%

14. Spain

3,337

1,342

20,720

6.5%

15. Sweden

1,774

1,705

30,911

5.5%

16. USSR

1,515

486

31,738

1.5%

17. Venezuela

4,577

5,571

19,221

29.0%

18. Yugoslavia

756

477

19. Canada

35,395

41,999

67,556

62.2%

20. Japan

20,790

32,973

130,436

25.3%

State
United States (total)
1. Australia
2. Austria

8. Ghana
9. Hungary

12. Netherlands
13. Poland

135.

414

8,988.610

International Monetary Fund, supra note 121, at 379, 380-82.

Into the US.
N/A

5.3%
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Table 2136
1990 Import-Export Statistics for CISG-Member States
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Annual U.
Exports
(by state)

Anual US.
Imports
(by state)

Value Exported
Annually

% or Exports
Imported
Into the US.

393,592

516,987

NIA

N/A

I. Australia

8,602

4,898

38,911

12.6%

2. Austria

873

1,374

41,392

3.3%

3. Chile

1,672

1,571

8,539

18.4%

4. China

4,807

16,296

69,470

23.5%

5. Finland

1,126

1,358

26,570

5.1%

6. France

13,652

13,594

216,394

63%

7. Germany

18,699

29,010

409,274

7.1%

8. Ghana

139

178

1,366

13.0%

9. Hungary

157

361

9,549

3.8%

7,987

13,395

169,939

7.9%

11. Mexico

28,375

30,797

29,982

12. Netherlands

13,016

5,358

131,465

4.1%

407

443

14,485

3.1%

14. Spain

5,208

3,546

55,187

6.4%

15. Sweden

3,404

5,112

56,937

8.9%

16. USSR

3,237

1,296

64,728

2.0%

17. Venezuela

3,107

9,938

16,414

60.5%

566

797

14,356

5.6%

19. Canada

82,959

93,780

131,278

71.4%

20. Japan

48,585

93,070

278,678

32.4%

State
United States (Total)

10. Italy

13. Poland

18. Yugoslavia

102.7%"

136. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Stadtics Yearbook 2, 3-7 (1991).
137. The reporting procedures employed by the International Monetary Fund allow for
discrepancies when data compiled is from both the exporting and the importing countries, hence the
appearance that the U.S. imported more than Mexico reports having exported.
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